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Newsletter:  Dec 2001/ Issue 1
John Shalikashvili Voices Support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

“The single greatest danger in history since the cold war is the danger posed from the proliferation of nuclear weapons,” stated John M. Shalikashvili during his spring visit to PNNL as a guest speaker for the Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security’s seminar series. Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Clinton Administration, during which he served as principal military advisor to the president, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council, reiterated his strong support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as expressed in his January 5th 2001 report to the president. The report, preceded by a 10-month long review, offered insights and recommendations regarding the CTBT and its significance to global and national security.

The goal of the CTBT is to deter non-nuclear states from developing nuclear weapons and to constrain the ability of countries already possessing nuclear weapons to develop new types of weapons by prohibiting all nuclear explosions. This prohibition would create a scenario in which production or possession of nuclear bombs is not illegal, but detonating them is. By December 2000, the CTBT had been signed by 160 countries and ratified by 69. However, the Treaty cannot enter into force until it has been ratified by 44 specified nations recognized as possessors of nuclear weapons or research reactors. Currently, the CTBT has been signed by all of these states with the exception of India, Pakistan and North Korea, and has been ratified by 30 of the required 44. Countries that have ratified the CTBT include Britain, France and Russia. Those that have not include China and the United States. The United States Senate was divided along party lines on the issue, and consequently rejected the Treaty in October of 1999. The Senate’s rejection of the Treaty raised much concern around the world over what would happen to global nonproliferation efforts should the United States abandon its leadership role in this capacity.

Shalikashvili expressed his support for the CTBT and his belief that the Treaty represents an important part of an integrated non-proliferation strategy made up of an intricate and fragile web of bilateral, regional, and global agreements. In attempt to “bridge the differences” of opinion over the Treaty, Shalikashvili stated that he’d “quietly met with the directors of national weapons labs, senators, scientists, opinion shapers, and representatives from former Presidents’ Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations” and that he took very seriously “every concern as valid… working hard to mitigate issues.”

In his final report, Shalikashvili identified four impediments to the United States Senate’s ratification of the CTBT:

1. There is doubt as to whether the Treaty has a genuine non-proliferation value.

2. Some fear that the verification regime required by the Treaty is not reliable enough to ensure sufficient compliance.

3. It is uncertain whether the United State’s nuclear stockpile can be adequately maintained without conducting nuclear explosive testing.

4. There is reluctance to “freeze” the United States into a Treaty that does not have a specified time duration.

Scientific opinion has been split on the question of whether verification regimes to ensure compliance with the CTBT are sufficient. In 1998, however, PNNL scientists developed two verification technologies which would enable a major leap in verification power through their ability to detect nuclear detonations by analyzing the atmosphere for traces of radioactive material. The devices, ARSA, the Automated Radioxenon Sampler/Analyzer, and RASA, the Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler/Analyzer, are considerably more sophisticated than other available monitoring devices. They have greater sensitivity, full automation, near real-time reporting, and highly capable nuclear radiation detectors.

“Although President Bush has said the CTBT would be difficult to enforce, his administration is still undecided about how it stands on the CTBT,” stated Shalikashvili. “My hope is that the Bush administration will take appropriate actions on fixing these identified concerns.” Shalikashvili also urged, “We need to weigh the risks and advantages of ratifying the agreement and realize that the CTBT is one of the tools necessary for a comprehensive arms control strategy.”

As expressed in his report submitted to the president, Shalikashvili’s great concern is that the longer entry into force is delayed, the more likely it is that other countries will move to acquire nuclear weapons, or significantly improve their current nuclear arsenal, and that it will become increasingly difficult to mobilize international support against such activities. As also made clear in his report, Shalikashvili believes it is strongly in the interest of the United States to participate in the final negotiations of the Treaty, stating that, “The outcomes just aren’t as good when the US doesn’t lead.”