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Newsletter:  May 2003/ Issue 4
Threat Reduction: The Radiological Challenge

In the aftermath of September 11, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) began the Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) program in response to heightened concern over the threat of a radiological attack. The RDD program, operated by the Department of Energy (DOE), has established partnerships with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and several nations, particularly Newly Independent States (NIS), in securing radiological material, and preventing its theft and diversion for use in weapons.

The RDD program is part of DOE’s Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program, the objective of which is to reduce the threat of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-usable material of the former Soviet Union (FSU). The RDD program’s focus is securing radioactive material usable in a “dirty bomb”—an explosive device containing radioactive material. Such material is available in most countries, and over 100 countries may have inadequate controls to prevent and detect the theft of these materials, according to the IAEA.

“Our mission is to deny materials from getting into the hands of terrorists,” said Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) RDD program manager, Keith Freier (PNNL was tasked by NNSA to play an integrating role in the management and oversight of the new RDD program).

In this pursuit, the program is presently working with the IAEA and counterparts in Russia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Latvia, to locate and secure orphan sources. There are also plans underway for cooperation with other countries and regions throughout the world. A large component of recent efforts has been the identification and consolidation of sites containing “high risk” radioactive materials.

“Once a candidate site is identified as containing attractive radiological materials, our first step is to conduct a site assessment to determine the types, quantities, and activity levels of the material inventory. A typical site may consist of multiple buildings with materials (usable in the assembly of a radiological device) in each. Therefore, a principle objective of the program is to find ways to consolidate the materials into one centralized location, thus allowing us to focus on implementing physical security upgrades at one location rather than many,” explained Freier.

Besides working with international partners to consolidate and physically secure radiological materials, the RDD program is seeking to reduce radiological weapons trafficking by creating chokepoints at the ports, railways and highways on major transport routes.

The challenge of reducing the threat of a radiological attack is manifold. First, radiological weapons are, perhaps, more appropriately referred to as “weapons of mass disruption” because of their potential to cause significant financial loss, damage of infrastructure, and widespread fear and panic, rather than high casualties.
“Look at what two little envelopes of anthrax did—it shut down the entire Senate,” stated Argonne National (Continued on page 5) Laboratory RDD consultant, Roy Lindley, intimating the much greater potential for disruption and “ripple effect” held by radiological weapons. “What terrorists learned from September 11 is that they can use our infrastructure against us.”

Secondly, the various isotopes impact the human body differently.

“Some things are just as bad in nano-Curies as others are by the Curie,” said Lindley, explaining that the consequences of exposure to radiation depend on variables like the material to which one is exposed, and the type and length of exposure.

There has, however, been consensus within the program that efforts should be narrowed to focus on radioisotopes that are the most easily accessible in quantities large enough to pose a threat.

Thirdly, radioactive materials come in variety of forms, such as pellets and powder, affecting the ease with which materials can be dispersed.

Lastly, the issues of abandoned and orphaned materials have contributed greatly to the enormity of the RDD program’s challenge.

While only a handful of manufacturers produce the vast majority of isotopes, making it relatively easy to trace them to their source, there is very little in the way of regulatory procedure or legal requirements for the disposal of radioactive devices. As a consequence, many are simply discarded or abandoned when their half-life is up and their performance diminishes.

Orphan materials, defined by the IAEA as those outside of official regulatory control, are of particular concern in the FSU, where political upheaval, economic hardship, as well as a lack of inventory records, have left many of the tens of thousands of radioactive sources produced by the Soviets unaccounted for and vulnerable to diversion and use in weapons. In the Republic of Georgia, there has been a string of incidents in which people have suffered severe effects after stumbling upon canisters of cesium-137 used in agricultural experiments during the Soviet era. Several radioisotope thermoelectric generators that were used by the Soviets for communications and navigational purposes in remote northern territories, and which contain up to 40,000 Curies of radioactive material—a quantity rarely found in a single device—cannot be found. And, there is evidence suggesting that such materials have already drawn the interest of violent organizations, including a documented incident in 1996 in which Chechen separatists planted, though did not detonate, a cesium-137 source in Russia’s Izmailovo Park, located in Moscow, in order to demonstrate the country’s vulnerability to such an attack.

While orphan materials are prevalent in the FSU, it must also be noted that according to the IAEA, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission reports 1,500 radioactive sources orphaned by the commercial sector since 1996, and a European Union (EU) study estimates that approximately 30,000 sources in the EU are at risk of becoming orphaned.

“It’s unrealistic to think we can have 100 percent, absolute control of these materials…” said Freier, acknowledging the enormity of the task on hand. “What we are really seeking to do is to reduce the risk to an acceptable level.”

While the challenge posed by the prevalence of radionuclide sources can be daunting, the RDD program has a growing list of international partners, and has experienced several recent accomplishments.

In October of last year, the RDD team and counterparts in the Republic of Georgia completed rapid physical security upgrades at a facility where several orphan sources were consolidated. Georgia, which has recovered over 280 radioactive sources since the mid-nineties, has both major smuggling routes cutting through its territory, and a large quantity of orphan radioactive material remaining from Soviet times, making the country a major concern in the struggle to reduce the radiological weapon threat.

Similar physical security upgrades have been completed at various site locations in Uzbekistan. The NNSA RDD team is also working with a government institute in Uzbekistan to improve security at a variety of (Continued on next page) medical facilities. Medical equipment used for diagnoses and treatment constitutes a large amount of radioactive material used in the commercial sector, making proper management and safeguards important.

And, there are projects currently underway with government entities in Russia to create regional sites for the consolidation and long-term storage of orphan sources resulting from Russia’s fifty-year legacy of isotope production. The legacy left the country with an enormous amount of materials that need to be identified and secured. This work is being done in connection with the Russia RADON facilities, which are regional repositories for the disposal of non-nuclear radioactive waste such as that from medical and scientific devices.

Also, on June 12, a tripartite agreement was signed between the United States Department of Energy, Russia’s Atomic Energy Ministry (MINATOM) and the IAEA to work together to locate, recover, secure and recycle radioactive sources in the former Soviet Union that are outside the control of nuclear regulators. The agreement stipulated the creation of a working group to develop a proactive strategy to accomplish these goals in respect to orphan sources.

“The challenge is that you have to balance a lot of different things,” said Lindley, naming several stages from production, to distribution and disposal where security can be improved, and access reduced. “You have to locate where (in the cycle) there is the best bang for the buck for reducing threat,” he added, expressing the need for prioritizing and optimally using resources to meet this challenge.