home << newsletters << Fall 2004 index << Export Control: Keeping Nuclear Materials and Technology in Legitimate Hands
 

Newsletter:  Fall 2004/ Issue 6
Export Control: Keeping Nuclear Materials and Technology in Legitimate Hands

by Oksana Elkhamri

Fear of terrorism. Revelations about the extensive network for the illicit sale of nuclear technologies established by the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, A Q Khan. Heightened concerns about the acquisition of nuclear weapons and weapons production capabilities by countries as geographically and politically diverse as North Korea, Libya, and Iran.

These headlines have focused U.S. and international attention on the importance of nuclear export controls. This is the first in a series of articles on export control work carried out by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) staff to help prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and enhance global security. Subsequent articles will focus on Laboratory programs that examine the impact of globalization on nuclear export controls, analyze the emerging patterns of sensitive technology trade in the global economy, and enhance the capabilities of key countries to control exports involving chemical, biological, and nuclear technologies and materials.

A number of U.S. agencies have export control responsibilities. PNNL is working closely with the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Export Control Policy and the Department of State, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, and Department of Defense to help countries improve their export control capabilities and advance U.S. nonproliferation objectives. These include efforts to address evolving proliferation threats such as emerging secondary suppliers, onward proliferation, and trans-shipment of materials subject to export control restrictions.

"Export control is an inter-agency and inter-governmental process that requires expertise and cooperation by many diverse actors in order to be effective," adds Kevin Whattam, who manages the export control program at PNNL for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Export Control Policy and Cooperation. "It does little good for one country alone to limit the dissemination of technology. Effective export control requires both strong national programs and coordinated multi-national efforts. Because transshipment hubs are the weak spot of a successful export control regime, even countries that themselves are not suppliers of technology need to be included in international export control programs. That is a big challenge because it requires establishing collaborative working relationships with many countries."

"Export control programs focused on security-related commodities are designed to regulate and limit the diffusion of technologies," observes Chuck Willingham, a scientist at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory who leads the Central Asia component of the international export control program. "They strive to control the behavior of the suppliers (exporters), the brokers and freight forwarders, the trans-shippers, and the buyers (importers) of technologies identified as sensitive -- without hindering international commerce and trade. This is done by establishing processes to identify the controlled technologies, license the legitimate transfer of controlled technologies, enforce the control process, exchange information, and promote industry awareness and compliance."

International Nonproliferation Export Controls Program (INECP)

The Laboratory is currently supporting the International Nonproliferation Export Controls Program (INECP), a DOE program aimed at preventing WMD proliferation by working with countries around the world to develop effective national systems of export controls. DOE collaborates with the Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS), and the departments of Defense, Commerce, and Homeland Security to achieve the goals of this program. The INECP helps countries develop their export control systems and capability by providing technical assistance, equipment, and training, with an emphasis on building sustainable systems.

"In this program we work with governmental officials, export controls experts, and enforcement specialists to improve the three core elements of the country’s export control system - licensing procedures and practices, enforcement, and industry compliance. We also emphasize and encourage establishment of effective interagency cooperation because it is so important to program success," said Tye Blackburn, a PNNL scientist who is working on export controls and controlled metals identification in the Central Asia component of the program. Blackburn is supporting the Commodity Identification Training (CIT) programs that promote WMD nonproliferation and export control awareness by staff in the customs and border guard organizations of key countries. In this program, he is assisting enforcement agencies to develop curricula, technical guides, and related technical tools to improve enforcement officials’ ability to recognize proliferation sensitive materials, equipment, and technologies.

For example, Blackburn is working with Kazakhstan and other countries to take advantage of a PNNL-developed technology that uses X-Ray fluorescence to identify the metal in equipment that is being transported through strategic ports-of-entry. This hand-held device enables inspectors to recognize controlled materials in real-time and in the field. The PNNL team is working with scientific organizations in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to help them integrate INECP-developed CIT technical materials into the courses used to train customs and border officers at their local academies and colleges.

In Kazakhstan, PNNL has recently organized a seminar that brought together governmental agencies as well as customs and border organizations to assess the gaps and needs in the licensing system of the country. In preparation for this seminar, they conducted an assessment of the country’s industrial and scientific organizations to help the host country, Kazakhstan, determine what industries should be included in the outreach program.

Chuck Willingham recently returned from conducting a training session in Kazakhstan for the INECP Industry Outreach component designed to increase industry compliance in countries that are members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. On this trip, he and the U.S. team conducted training sessions with Kazatomprom, several Kazakhstan governmental agencies and national laboratories, and Ulba Metallurgical Plant. The purpose of the seminar was to help these nuclear entities better understand the international and domestic nonproliferation and export control regimes and to help them create effective and efficient internal corporate export control systems.

The training sessions included a table-top exercise to help the participants clarify the appropriate roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms for their organizations. "We encourage industry managers to attend these workshops so they can then put an export control program in place in their companies that is in compliance with the national licensing program and meets international standards," Willingham explained. "Because of our experience with export control work in other countries, we have been able to assemble an effective template for these training programs that includes real-life examples."

This seminar was just one in a series of events INECP has planned for Kazakhstan. A subsequent industry outreach seminar was held at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust’ Kamenogorsk in June.

In another aspect of the Outreach program, Whattam recently presented a paper on PNNL’s internal export control program at a US/China government exchange on export controls in Beijing. PNNL’s internal program is designed to ensure that the Laboratory meets U.S. and international export control laws and policies. “In addition to the education and technical assistance these exchanges provide," Whattam stated, "they also create the opportunity to work directly with key government and industry leaders and to build a stronger international network of the people working on proliferation prevention. "As an added benefit, they also give our PNNL staff an opportunity to work closely with the DOE export control staff and other people involved in export controls."