Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation
The rapidly advancing technologies and inherent dual-use (peaceful vs. weapons) nature of the knowledge and technologies of the life sciences have increased concerns regarding the safety and security of knowledge and material associated with the life sciences. The Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security engages in work to enhance the nonproliferation of biological and/or chemical weapons. This has included: Support of international treaties and agreements (Biological Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons Convention, Australia Group, UN Security Council Resolution 1540), the development and utilization of legal/regulatory frameworks which can be used to improve the security of chemical/biological facilities and materials, education and outreach regarding dual-use concerns and scientist responsibility in life science research, and other technical/policy/legal studies related to BW and CW threat assessment and nonproliferation. Several areas of current focus are described below. For more information, contact Heidi Mahy or Richard Weller.
Codes of Conduct and Scientist Responsibility
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Experts' Group Meeting held in June, 2005, focused on ‘The Content, Promulgation and Adoption of Codes of Conduct for Scientists'. As part of their preparations, the U.S. delegation to the Experts' Group wanted to hear the views of scientists in a range of life sciences fields regarding the feasibility of drafting and implementing a code of conduct and the implications such a code might have for their research and careers. The Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security convened a workshop to discuss the prospect of developing a code of conduct for the life sciences intended to minimize the potential for research advancements in the life sciences to contribute to the development of biological weapons. This workshop, held March 17th-18th, 2005, gathered together representatives from federal agencies, government laboratories and academia. The workshop provoked some insightful and diverse discussion regarding the potential costs and benefits of developing and implementing a code of conduct. There was a great variety of viewpoints regarding the need and effectiveness of a code. The views expressed in this workshop and follow-up discussions were incorporated into the presentations made by the U.S. delegation at the Experts' Group meetings of the Biological Weapons Convention. The Center is currently engaged in education and outreach within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories regarding individual responsibility, dual-use concerns, and U.S. obligations under the BWC.
UNSCR 1540 and Legislation Compliance
The United Nations (U.N.) Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1540 in April 2004. It was a landmark measure that legally binds all U.N. Member States (191 in total) under the security provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and the powers vested in the Security Council to enact and enforce domestic legislation to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). More specifically, they must establish requirements for material protection and accounting, border security, transshipment, and exports relating to chemical, biological, and nuclear materials, as well as the means of delivery for these if converted into weapons. Additionally, the resolution calls upon states to promote dialogue and cooperation on nonproliferation and to take cooperative action to prevent illegal trafficking. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the Center for Global Security are assessing possible mechanisms for implementing UNSCR 1540, including compliance assistance and developing model legislation, strengthening the international agreement on biological weapons security, the Biological Weapons Convention, and enhancing nonproliferation of biological weapons.
Assessment of Emerging Issues
The rapid advance of science means a constantly shifting threat of terrorism and proliferation. The Center for Global Security and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory develop threat assessments regarding the nature of new scientific disciplines and technologies. Assessments discuss both the technical and the policy ramifications of a new discipline or technology. One such recent assessment for the National Nuclear Security Administration examined the nature of the emerging discipline of synthetic biology, and considered options for mitigating the potential threat.